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This report highlights the results of contractural studies of
transport accident data undertaken in a joint research program sponsored
by the FAA and NASA. From these accident data studies it was concluded
that the greatest potential for improved transport crashvorthiness is in
• the reduction of fire related fatalities. Accident data pertaining to :
fuselage integrity, main landing gear collapse, fuel tank rupture, wing
breaks, tearing of tank lower surfaces, and engine pod _crubbing are
discussed. In those accidents where the energy absorbing protective
capability of the fuselage structure is expended and the airplane
experiencea major structural damage, trauma caused fatalities are also
discussed. The dynamic performance of current seat/restraint systems
are examined but it is concluded that the accident data does not
adequately define the relationship between occupant response and the
dynamic interaction with the seat, floor and fuselage structure.
INTRODUCTION
Aviation Crash Dynamics Research has a history dating back to the
early 1940's. During that period for the first time the idea of
design_ag an aircraft for occupant survivability was given genuine
consideration. Crashworthiness research was initiated by onsite
investigation of aircraft accidents to identify those structural
components and subsystems which contributed to occupant injuries and/or
fatalities. Crashworthiness is the characteristic of a system which
provides for survivability of occupants. The concepts of
crashworthiness were further advanced through the research efforts of
the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) (1,2), the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (3,4), _nd continued later by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) (5-16). These
efforts focused on both light- and transport airplane data in the areas
of; (a). Post-Crash-Fire, (b). Fuel Containment, (c). Aircraft Component
and Sub-System Behavior, (d) Crash Environment Data, and (e).
ditching.
Within the past 15 years, (1965-1980) renewed f_f_.rts have been
directed to improving the crashworthiness capability of aircraft. In
the 1960's, the U.S. Army in an effort to reduce crash injuries and
i fatalities, investigated a number of helicopter aircraft accidents (17)
identifying crash in3uries and the injury causing mechanisms and
_i embarking upon a substantial crashworthiness research program. These
efforts culminated in the publication in 1967 of the Army's Crash
i Survival Design Guide (18). This guide is used as a tool by aircraft
, designers and manufacturers to incorporate crashworthiness design
features into U.S. Army aircraft. The Army's efforts in crashworthiness
have been extremely successful and rewarding. This success is directly
attributable to a thorough evaluation of availabl_ accident data
involving U.S. Army helicopter and flxed-wing aircraft.
For many years, the emphasis in aircraft accident investigation has
been placed on determining the cause of the accident, with very little
effort in identifying structural problems associated with crash
t
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survival. It is becoming apparent, through recognition of the U.S. Army 1
success in helicopter crashworthiness,that safety in civil aviation can !
be further enhanced if crash survival improvements are incorporated
during the initial phases of aircraft design. In January 1980, a
NASA study contract was initiated with the three major transport
aircraft manufacturers, Boeing Commercial Airplane Company,
Lockheed-Callfornia Company, and McDonnell Douglas Corporation
(refs.19,20,21) to review and evaluate accident data and to:
(a). define a range of crash situations that might form the basis i
for developin_ improved crashworthiness design technology, 1
: (b). identify structural components and aircraft systems that
influence the crash dynamic behavior of an aircraft,
(c). define areas of research and identify approaches for
improving crash survivability of transport aircraft,
(d). identify test techniques, test data, analytical methods_
etc., needed to evaluate the crash dynamic response of transport
aircraft. ':
Transport airplane travel is a relatively safe mode of
transportation, accounting for less than 1 percent of the total
transportation fatalities per year, and jet transport airplane
performance in particular exhibits lower accident statistics than
nonjets. Nevertheless, the introduction of the wide-body jumbo jet with
its 300 to 400 passenger complement p:cesents the potential for
substantial loss of llfe or injuries in a single accident. Further the
use of new advanced materials dictates that efforts continue in safety
research to enhanze occupant survivability in the event of a crash.
With the continued technical advances in analytical predictive methods
and experimental methods, many tools are becoming available for use by
the airplane designez in addressing the crash response characteristics
of future aircraft.
The purpose of this report is to dellaeate, from accident data,
those structurally-related systems of transport aircraft that i
significantly participate in or influence the dynamic crash beh_-_ior of
an aircraft and its occupants in a crash situation. While primarily
concerned with occupant safety, the secondary benefits of crashworthy
• design concepts should not be overlooked. The necessity of considering
crash safety in airplane design does not and should not, of itself,
dictate increased costs. In the long run, designing for crash safety
may prove to be cost effective in reducing operation and capital costs.
OBJECTIVE i .
1
The objective of the pres=nt study is to determine, with as much
documented accldel_t data as possible, the basic definition of _
representative crash scenarios experienced by transport airplanes in
survivable or partially survivable accidents. Value limits of initial
conditions observed for different classes of crash ocenarios are
discussed, and an approximate range of initial crash conditions is
presented. To this end all available public transport accident data, as
well as private transport manufacturers airplane data relevant to
transport crash behavior, was reviewed and evaluated. In addition,
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r!rcraft structural components and subsystems were further identified
: and rated as to their participation in, or influence on, the crash
dynamic behavior of e transport airplane and its occupants during a
i crash situation. ESTABLISILMENT OF ACCIDENT STUDY BASE
m
j Accident Data Summary
I Many safety-related design changes and improvements in present day
! aircraft have as their foundation previous operational experience and
I accident data. Accident investigation has historically placed emphasis
on determining the cause of the accident with little consideration being
, given to structural features that may influence or relate to injuries
and/or fatalities. With this realization, a study was undertaken wlth
the three leading transport manufacturers (refs. 19, 20, 21) to examine
transport accident data to assess to the extent possible the behavior
and participation of various structural subsystems during a crash. The
material contained in the present paper is based almost entirely on the
results of these studies, specifically centered on the following two
tasks:
(a) To review and evaluate transport aircraft accident data, define
a range of survivable crash conditions or crash scenarios that might
form a basis for developing improved crashworthiness design technology
(b) To identify structural features and subsystems that influence
i injuries/fatalities in the crash scenario defined in (a).
The data base for this study began with a review of 933 worldwide
jet transport accidents which occurred between the years 1959-1979
inclusive. Sources of this data were the files of the FA._/JAB, National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), International Civil Av.iatlon
Organization, British Air Registration Board, Airline Pilots
Associatlon, and transport aircraft manufacturer's in addition reports
in peclodicals and newspaper and official accident reports released by
foreign governments. Early reports (Circa 1960) contained, for the most
part, sparse details on structural factors and the cause of occupant
injury/fatalities. Later accident reports are more detailed
particularly in the cases of those accidents investigated by the NTSB.
These reports address not only the structural response but also human
factors , define sequence of events, cause of injury/fatallty,
performance of cabin interior equipment, and factors affecting emergency
egress.
The data base was evaluated with the intent of considering
survivable structural accidents only• _le following criteria were
established for statistics to be considered in this data base:
(a) Airframe survivable volume was maintained during impact and
prior to severe fire.
(b) At least one occupant did not die from trauma.
(c) Potential for egress was present.
(d) Accident demonstrated structural or system performance.
Criterion (b) is significantly more severe than the FAR criterion
or NTSB definitions of a survivable accident. Criterlol_ (b) does not
i
1983019709-004
ORIGINAL PAGE 18 4
" OF POOR QUALITY "
mean that if one survives all should survive; rather, it means that one
occupant was able to withstand the accident environment in his immediate
vicinity. This permits accidents to be considered for research
definition and direction that are beyond the scope of current design
criteria.
Accidents in which tt , structural airframe played no significant
role, such as flight turbul_nce accidents or maintenance [_rsonnel
accidents on the ground, were disregarded in this study. Also _ _
disregarded were severe, nonsurvivable midair collision a_cldents. The |
' exclusion of these accidents might alter statistics derived from the |
data base, consequently care is required in comparing the results of i .
this study to studies using other data bali_es. Comparisons with other
studies however, indicate that all "known" severe but potentially
survivable accidents involving commercial jet transports have been
included in the present study. All information contained in the present
paper has been gleaned from references 19, 20, and 21, and these
references should be consulted for further details concerning the
accident data.
Aircraft Type
Airplane operating weight classes deslgnated to assist in the
evaluation of the accident data were: "Light", "Meditmn", "Heavy", and
"Widebody". _ese weights are depicted in figure I (ref. 21) as
classes B, C, D, and E. Weight cla_s A represents all airplanes less
than 12500 ibs (maximum takeoff) (the FAA designation of general
aviation airplanes); weight class B "Light", 12500 - 100000 ibs ; weight
class C "Medium", 100000 - 250000 ibs ; weight class D "Heavy", 250000 -
400000 Ibs; and weight class E "Widebody", 400000 - 800000 Ibs.
Table 1 (ref. 21) shows the breakdown, by airplane weight class
and severity of injury (fatal, serious, minor) for the period 1964 to
1977 based on NTSB accident reporting in which non-structural accident
types have been eliminated. The percentages sho_i in table 1 indicate
that fatalities and serious injury accidents represent 13.5% and 12.3%,
respectively, of the total. During this 14 year period only 5.0% of the
accidents involved widebody aircraft. This low percentage is partially
explained by the fact that the influence of these aircraft was not felt
until the early 1970"s.
In fiBure l(b) the distribution of each type of aircraft in a
weight class (ref. 22) currently being used in the worldwide commercial
fleets are shown as well as the cumulative service years (i.e., number
of aircraft multiplied by years in service, ref. 23). The medium
weight class (C) accounts for 67 percent of the aircraft and 63 percent
of the cumulative service years. The widebody aircraft (E) currently
include 20 percent of the aircraft and less than I0 percent of the
cumulative service years.
Table 2 (ref. 21) presents data which show the distributJon of
aircraft damage, postcrash fire, and primary accident types as a
function of the severity of injury. For the structural-related
accidents, the 63 fatal accidents are associated with 63 airplanes
destroyed and 61 postcrash fires. There are a large number of accidents t,'
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(220, Table 2) in which aircraft experienced substantial damage and in
which minor, or no, injuries occurred. This type of damage is usually
local, such as in the landing gear region. From the bottom of the right
hand column of table 3 (ref. 21) it can be observed from the
structural-related accidents that of the I05(X,Y) accidents involving
fatalities and/or serious injuries (63 + 42), 59% occur during landing,
• 19% occur during takeoff and 14% are associated with inflight accidents.
Controlled and uncontrolled collisions with ground-water ( table 3, I.
A,B) account for 67% of the infllght fatal accidents. Table 4 (ref.
21) show the distribution of accident types as a functlo_t of airplane
weight class (fig. I). Considering the number of different airplanes
in each weight class there is relatively little accident data available
for each particular airplane model.
Aircraft Size
Accident cases were categorized with respect to size as measured by
operating weight in figure I(A) (ref. 21). Weight classes B and C form
a short haul light weight group up to 160000 Ibs. A second, heavier,
short haul group is formed from weight class C ranging from 160000 ibs
to 250000 Ibs. Weight class D forms a narrow body long haul group,
while the heavier wide body aircraft over 400000 Ibs long haul group,
weight class E.
Referring to figure 2a each size group is represented in the data
base. Smaller short haul aircraft constitute approximately 40% of the
cases, larger short haul group approximately 20% of the cases, narrow
body long haul group approximately 35% and wide body long haul aircraft
approximately 5%. Of particular interest is the effect of size on
aircraft crash performance and survivability. Considering the effects
of scale as in dynamic modeling, it might be expected that larger
aircraft would fare better than smaller aircraft if the crash
environment is not scaled up. Further, the individual occupant doe_ not
scale up, but becomes relatively smaller in the larger aircraft with a
corresponding improvement in survival prospects. For instance fuselage
structural elements such as frames and stringers are stronger in an
absolute sense and offer greater energy absorbing capability for larger
commercial jet aircraft than for smaller propeller driven aircraft.
This feature provides an inherent crashworthlness to the _et as compared
to the propeller aircraft. A qualltativc assessment of the accident
data seems to indicate that relative size wlthln the jet group has only
minor effects on the crash performance of commercial jet transports. In
general, it takes a larger tree, a larger house, and a deeper or wider
ditch to do equivalent damage to a large aircraft. Since no two
accidents are identical, an accurate comparison of damage between a
large and small jet airframe cannot be made.
There is some indication that there may be an effect of size
between some smaller propeller driven transport aircraft and the current
jet fleet. Although not included in the study data base of ref. 21
three accidents were reviewed that involved high wing, propeller-_riven
alrcreft of one generic type. In these accidents the seat response was
different from that observed in survivable jet aircraft accidents in
1983019709-006
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that m_ny _o=r_ .o_-_ v .... _-- there Were iusLances of sea_
"stacking" in the forward fuselage and seat ejection on a large scale.
these propeller driven aircraft, because of their smaller dimensional
and structural arrangement, may present a smaller mass ratio of airframe
to seats than do the larger jet aircraft. This situation may account
for the different meat crash response seen by the two types of aircraft. !
r Mrcraft Configuration
Accident cases were categorized wlth respect to configuration In
figure 2b (ref. 21)_ Emphasis wa3 placed on differences between
aircraft types and service uses. The aircraft fuselage internal con-
figuration was classified according to type of service, i.e., passenger
or _on-passenger. Also in the internal fuselage configuration is the
presence of body fuel cells and body fuel lines. The external l
configuration differences are related to fuselage width, engine
rplacement, landing gear, and fuel cells.
" By referring to figure 2b, approxlma_ely 20% of transport airplane !
accidents involve non-passenger service. Non-passenger service was
further divided into cargo, training, aqd positioning flights. As
regards cargo service, a review of the accident data shows some cases
where cargo shift during tho accident increased the hazard to the flight
crew. (A notable instance is an accident where cattle pens broke loose
during an overrun and blocked the cockpit door). Training accidents
most frequently involve englne-out takeoff attempts. _lese accidents
involve extreme yaw and roll angles with ground strikes of wings,
engines or aft fuselage. _me accidents involve touch-and-go landing
practice.
The principle variation in structural configuration is In placement
of engines. Approximately b0% of the accidenta Involve aircraft wlth
wing mounted engines and 37% involve aft mcunted engines while 3%
involve wlng and aft body mounted engines. The aft mounted engines only !
separated from the aircraft due to high acceleration loading, while the
wlng/pylon mounted engines separated both from high acceleratioas and
from contact with external objects. The Comet IV has engines mounted
Internally in the wings which help to contain the engines in a crash.
In figure 2c it may be seen that engine separation occurred In 55%,
landing gear collapse or separation occurred in 75%, wlng box breaks
occurred in 45%, fuselage breaks occurred in 48%, and water ditching
impact breakup occurred in 3% of the accidents. The separation of an I,
eilglne and the breaking ot a wing box imply fuel spills. In some 1!
instances a fuselage break in an aizcraft with aft moun_ed engines also
caused a fuel spill. The wide body long haul aircraft have main body
: landing gear that transfer high impact loads to the fuselage structure.
Water ditching impact breakup is com_idered separately from fuselage
breaks because in general the forces involved are different.
in figure 2d engine placement was observed to affect the flre
hazard. In particular, aft body location is associated with the
breaking of engine fuel lines and body fuel lines. Wing pylon mounted ,
location had, in addition to fuel llne breaks, the rupturing of wing
' fuel tanks due to pylon/englne separation. The engines mounted !
L
t
1983019709-007
OR!GINALPAGF F9 7DFPO0 R
" QUALITy
: internally in the w!ng_ with _ing pod fu_l cell tanks exhibit engine
, fires. The wing pod cell tanks have separated due to high accelerations
and have contacted external objects. The associated fire hazard was
tank rupture.
Containment of fuel, spread/scatter of fuel, and ignition of fuel
constitute major areas of study for improving survivability in jet
, transport accidents. Ignition sources are usually present in aircraft
crashes. Hot sections of engines provide an ignition source and landing
gear failure usually produce showers of sparks due to friction of
structure rubbing the ground. Electrical arcing may occur when the
electrical compartment is penetrated or when electric wiring is severed
i as in the instance of engine/pylon separation.
Operation Phase
The percentage of accidents by operational phase and by operational
time is shown in figure 3 (ref. 19). Considering those operational
phases taking place near or on the ground (Load, Taxi, Takeoff, Initial
climb, Initial Approach, Final Approach, Landing), 79.3% of the
accidents occur in 18% of the operational time. Further, those
accidents that occur during climb, cruise, and descent are generally
non-survivable and outside the range of this crash dynamics study.
The average distance from the airport that the various accident
types occur is shown in table 5. In figure 4 a normalized fatality
ratio (ref. 21) is plotted as a function of distance from the airport
in miles. TileFatality Ratio (FR) is the ratio of number ot fatalities/
total number of passengers onboard and a normalized fatality ratio is
obtained by dividing by the average fatality ratio, based on the total
number of reports and briefs considered. This average fatality ratio
was 0.1917 (ref. 21), and an "average" accident would have a normalized
fatality ratio equal to one. Normalized ratios above one and below one
are more and less severe, respectively, than the "average'. The
fatality ratio is related to the distance from airports at which
aircraft accidents occur. Accidents around airports such as "Hard
Landings", "Takeoff Aborts", and "Overshoots" are relatively fatality
free. Under- snoots which occur at approach velocities but involve
terrain with some degree of roughness and contour unpredictability at an
average distance of approximately 900 feet shy of the runway, are
moderately severe, but less than the average. Stalls, which occur on an
average about 1.2 miles from the airport, are severe accidents. The
airplane's uncontrolled attitude at impact during a stall contributes to
this severity. Collision with Obstacles at or near the airport are
relatively mild. Usually they involve wires and approach lights which
damage the airplane but do not inhibit the pilot from making a safe
landing. Injuries that result from this _ype of accident often occur
during the evacuation from the airplane. Collisions with Obstacles,
generally trees and buildings, are more fatal than the average. This
type of accident occurs on an average 2.3 miles from the airport and has
a fatality ratio equal to 1.86. Uncontrolled Ground/Water Collisions
occur on an average 2.7 miles from the airport and have a fatality ratio
of 3.26. The Uncontrolled Ground/Water Collision accident type occurs
I
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at an average distance of 8 miles from the airport and has a normalized
fatality ratio of 3.59, which is the highest of all the categories.
Table 6 shows a distribution of accident occurrence in the
proximity of airports. Based on a total of 441 accidents involving 455
aircraft (eight of the 455 aircraft were other than air carrier
aircraft) resulting in 447 accident reports in the NTSB accident summary
for 1964-69, approximately 50 percent of the accidents occurred at the
airport. However, these 50 percent account for only 17.6 percent and I
21.7 percent, respectively, of the accidents classified as fatal or
severe injury. The nearly 36 percent of the accidents that occur at
distances of five miles or more from the airport account for 50 percent
and 67 percent of the fatal and serious injury accidents, respectively.
The large number of fatal and serious injuries associated wJth accidents
which occur 5 or more miles from an airport attest to the facts that
extremely high impact conditions coupled with obstacles, uneven terrain,
and inaccessibility of flre-fighting equipment and personnel, all play a
role. In addition, these accidents may be characterized by a lack of
pilot control to minimize the severity of the crash. For these reasons
it appears that the primary emphasis of accident scenario studies should
be accidents in the vicinity of airports and generally associated with
the landing or takeoff phase of operation.
Validation of Data Base
The NTSB accident data was used as a basis for formulating accident
scenarios primarily because it provided the most details about
accidents. The NTSB data represents less than 29 percent of the total
accidents in the world during the period 1964-77. During this period of
time the NTSB summaries include 783 accidents compared to 2707 worldwide
accidents (reference 24). Figure 5 (ref. 21) shows a comparison of the
number of occurrences of fatal, serious injury and minor/noninjurious
accidents for both the original set of data (783) and the reduced
(structural-related) set (341) as a function of primary accident types.
The distribution and severity of injury exhibited by both sets of data
are similar.
Since the primary emphasis of this study is long-range future
aircraft with responsibility to perform in compliance with FAR25
requirements, the validity of using NTSB data has to be established. In
an attempt to do this the worldwide accident summaries were reviewed on
the same basis as the NTSB data as shown in Table 7. The summaries
provided in reference 24 were often sketchy and presented difficulties
ir_ establishing accident categories associated with many accidents.
Thus, the task of summarizing this data was not straightforward.
Working within these constraints and limiting the revxew to class B, C,
D, and E airplanes, a total of 660 worldwide accidents are summarized in
Table 7 as was done in Table 4 for the NTSB data. The worldwide data is
for the period of 1964-1979 rnd does not include the accidents in the
NTSB data file. Since "System Malfunction" and "Collisions with
Obstacles" often result in secondary accident conditions a comparison of
the two data sets on the basis of accidents in which the impact
conditions are more clearly defined is presented. A comparison of the I
two sets of data show the associated percentages are as follows: I
i.
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NTSB 20% 9.3% 70.7%
WORLDWIDE 20% 7% 73%
, The use of NTSB data upon which to formulate crash scenarios is
considered adequate since the data I) is representative of the accident
history; 2) more readily available; and, 3) consistent with the trends
associated with modern day jet usage.
Table 7 shows a comparison of the worldwide data versus the reduced
NTSB summary for severity of injury versus accident type. While
percentage distribution varies somewhat for each accident type the trend
of the data is consistent. For example, air to ground type accidents
such as controlled and uncontrolled collisions, stall, collision wlth
obstacles and undershoot, still show the highest percentage of fatal
accidents. Alr to ground type accidents s_ch as hard landing, wheels-up
or retracted gear show little or no fatality occurrence for both sets of
data. The worldwide data shows a higher percentage of fatal accident
occurrence for an undershoot accident and lower percentage of fatal
accident occurrence for an overshoot occurrence than does the NTSB data.
A ground-to-ground accident such as an overshoot_ or swerve, fatality
occurrence shows percentages of from 3 percent to 9 percent. Fatal
accidents as a result of gear collapse which occurs during landing,
takeoff and taxi, presumably at low speed, occur less than 5 percent of
the time. Undershoot accidents, which show a fatality accident
percentage which varies from 16 percent to 38 percent, are a cross
between a hard landing and air-to-ground collision. _le spread in fatal
accident percentage for this type accident may be associated with the
proximity to the airport at which this accident occurs.
Summary of the Selected Accident _tudy Data Base
The purpose of the selected accident study data base was to review
the historical accident data to identify and define aircraft behavior
and structural break-up and the a_ociated injury causing mechanisms or
factors. In an objective, but somewhat unavoidably subjective manner, a
combined total of 176 fairly-well documented survivable accidents were
chosen to form a data base from the total (341) examined in references
19, 20, and 21. A listing of these 176 accidents are given in Table 8.
This data base was then .used to study and assess the pertinent
structural behavloc of both the total airplane and aelected subsystems.
In a few isolated cases the one survivor condition for survivability was
waived when it was felt that trauma forces were within human tolerance
levels, but a fire hazard existed. The distribution of accident data
between the three contractors (refs. 19, 20, and 21) is illustrated in
figure 6. The three transport manufacturers generally examined
different accidents, but some accidents were examined by all three
manufacturers as indicated in the figure by the cross-hatched area, some
by two of the Lhree as indicated by the hatched areas, and other
accidents solely by one manufacturer (primarily the accidents involving
1983019709-010
ORIGINAL PAGE I_;
OF POOR QUALIT't io
his aircraft). It should be noted that accidents in the data base are
"potentially Impact-survlvable" due to the inherent structural
capability of the airframe.
A summary of the selected accident study data base from ref. ]9
only is presented in Table 9. A listing of these 153 well-docume"
accident cases are given in Table I0. _le accident data base ¢_
133 cases involving hull loss and 20 cases involving substantial r
There are 103 cases in which fire was present. In 95 of these ca_
dlrcraft suffered a hull loss and in the others the a_ccLa_t sL. ,
substantial damage. In addition there were 22 accideL_= _n which a t_
spill occurred but for which there was no fire. Som_ _ ( ese involved
s_tuatlons where the aircraft came to rest in ,_ or where the
climatic conditions such as low temperature precluded g.e vaporization
of fuel or where terrain drained the fuel away from the aircraft; but
for these circumstances those cases might also involve fire casualties
or further aircraft damage.
The data base contains i19 (or 78_ of the 153)accldents which
involve fatalities al_d/or serious injury. For this study the NTSB
definitions h_ve been extended fuL?her to identify the cause of the
fatallty/Injury. Trauma is taken to mean that the retail|y/injury is
caused by mechanical forces such as inertia forces resulting from high
accelerations or from impact with the surrounding structure. Fire/smoke
is assigned to those fatallties/injuries that result from burns, or
inhalation of hot gases, smoke or noxious fdmes. In some cases
passengers are presumed to have received trauma injuries that prevented
or slowed down their egress and as a result they died of smoke or
flames. For those accidents where the aircraft stopped in water,
fatalities due to drowning are identified. No attempt has been made to
identify injuries (chemical burns) due to contact with raw fuel althcugh
some instances have occurred. Referring to Table 9, it may be seen that
approximately 35% of the accidents involve fatalities due to trauma, 37%
involve fire/smoke, and 6% involve drowning. As regards the serious
injuries 60% involve trauma, and 30% involve flre/smoke. It should be
noted that some accidents may involve combinations of the above causes
of injury. The selected cases have attempted to address the serious but
survivable accident; bcwever, four special cases are included in thl_
data base. The first special case is a 707 at London in 1968 where the
aircraft caught fire on take off and made a successful landing but 5
deaths due to fire occurred during evacuation. The second special case
is a DC-8 at Toronto in 1970 where the aircraft was damaged during an
attempted landing and exploded during the subsequent attempted go-around
killing the 108 occupants. The third special case is a DC-9 at Bosto_
in 1973 where the aircraft struck a seawall, broke-up and burned; one
passenger walked out of the fire but died within 24 hours. The fourth
special case is a 737 MAdras accident in 1979 in which the detonation of
an explosive device in the forward lavatory led to landing conditions
that resulted in an overrun.
DEFINITION OF ACCIDENT CATEGORIES AND THEIR RELATION TO FATALITIES
Probable Cause of Accidents
1983019709-011
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he prohnhle cause of accidents is presented in figure 7 (ref.
19)• "Probable cause" is based on the determination of the accident
investigation team. For 13 accidents the cause i_ unknown. For 140
cases where cause has been determined 76.4% of the cases are attributed
to the cockpit crew, 11.1% to the airplane, 5% to weather, 2.!% to the
airport/air traffic controller, 1.4% to miscellaneous, 0.7% to
_aintenance, and 0.7% to sabotage.
The aircraft was the cause of the accident in 11% of the cases.
Landing gear systems and support structure were involved in 7 accidents.
Failures involved brakes, wheels, tires, and structure. Engine :_
dlsinteg.ation, thrust loss, and thrust reversers were involved in 6
accidents. Flight instrumentation was involved in 2 accidents and
grou,Ld _pc_llers and elevator trim tab were each involved in 1 accident.
From these data it may be concluded that a large percentage of the
accidents can be aL_ributed to human error such as pilot and ground
control assistance. Such items as ground proximity _arning, wind shear
]erection, automated landing and naviga£ion systems, and advanced
integrated sysgems for pilot assistance offer the best hope for
eliminating most accidents iD the "avoidable" category. Improved ground
control and reduction of hazards on and around nirpor_s is another area
for improved safety. The avoidance of collisions be_zeen aJrct ;t and
with ground vehicles should be attainable. Reduction of hazards such as
drainage ditches, poles, trees, columns, outbuildings at.d birds from
airports Js a matter of concern. In addition the overrun areas for
runways could be improved to reduce the severity of accidents In these
areas.
Accident Severity and Survivability
In a combined study of foreign and domestic (U.S. and possessions)
accidents involving the combined total rf selected survivable accidents
in refs. 19, 20, _nd 21, 98 domestic and 78 foreign accidents were
reviewed. A listi_g of these 17b accidents are given in Table 8. These
accidents contain th_ 91 domestic and 62 foreign accidents shown in
Table 9, In figure 8 the domestic and foreign accidents are compared on
the basis of percent fatalities to total occupants on board for "Phase
of Operation", figure 8(a), and "Fatality Categor7" figure 8(b). The
domestic accidents in the fatality category 8(b) show a ratio of trauma
- to-flre fatalities of 1.5 while the foreign aucidents show a reverse
ratlo of fire-to-trauma realities of approximately 2. These
differences are also apparent in fig_,_ 9 in which the "Failure Mode",
figure 9(a), and, "Accidents _ith Fire and Fatalities", figure 9(b), are
shown plotted versus percentage of accidents. Figure 9(a) has a higher
_ank rupture for foreign than domestic accidents, and figure 9(b)
ioJicates a general increase in fire and fire fatalitie_ for the foreign
accide't data when compared to domestic. These differences may reflect
the l_ck of documentation on trauma-related fatalities in the foreign
data or may indicate a real trend of an increased flre hazard in foreign
accidents.
Accidents have been assesged on the basis of amount of damage to
th_ aircraft and the effect of this (lamage on survivability. Structural •
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d_mage severity in aee|dpr.., contained in _he data base (ref 19) were T• i
' assembled into 6 categories as shown in table I_. In general the degree :
of structural damage and the energy _o be dissipated increases as the±
category increases. Categories I through 3 involve accidents in which
the occupant protective _hell is generally maintained and the fuel
system is not destroyed. At category 4, majo_ fuel spillage is
introduced. Three classes of fuselage break are used to Jistlnguish tile
severity of tile accident. A class I break has the fuselage brokee with
, fuselage sections essentially remaining together. _le opening allows
fuel/flre entry but is too small for occupant egress. In clas_ 2 breaks
the fuselage separates sufficiently to allow occupant egress and
fuel/fire entry, but the sections maintain proximity to one another.
Class 3 breaks have fuselage sections which separate _nd come Lo rest at
some distance from e_ch other. Category 3 accidents are severe
: accidents involving either severe lower fuselage crush or class I or 2
breaks, or both. However, in category 3 there are no major fuel spills.
Categories 5 and 6 involve i,_creasingly severe destruction of the
aircraft with serious breaks in fuel tankage.
The 153 well-documented accidents in the data base have been
grouped by category and are summarized in table 12 and figure I0, from
w'Jich some general observations may be made. First as regards overall
_rvivabillty, fire presents the greatest hazard. Known fire fatalities
outnumber known trauma fatalities by 2.8:1. (This is in contrast to th_
results presented in figure 8(b) for dom_stlc accident data only.) _he
foreign accident data reflects the same fire to trauma fatality ratio
(approximately) as given here. Fire hazard is most severe for accidents
having major fuel spills due to rupturiag of fuel tankage (categories 4,
5, and 6). Trauma fatalities occur mostly in categories 5 and 6 which
involve severe fuselage breaks. Little structural or detailed
information is available on several accidents in which a large
percentage of the occupants perished. Deep water impact accidents
represent less than 10% of the study data base. Water impact usually
results in severe damage to the lower fuselage, often accompanied by
class 2 breaks in the fuselage and separation of wings, engines, and
landing gear. In som_ cases many occpants drowned after evacuating the
aircraft. In other cases the high fatality rate was due to
inappropriate action of _he cabin crew_ after the aircraft cane to rest.
Last, as might have been anticipated, the overall survivability
generally decreases as the major structural damage to the aircraft
increases. Fo_ categories 5 and b, known fatalities due to fire and te
trauma appear in almost equal n_nbers. These categories also have the
largest percentages of undefined tatallties. The dashed line in figure
I0 is an extension of the fire fatalities curve if one adds all of the
undefined fatalities Lo the fire katalitles.
Category I accidents in Table 12 experienced only minor structural
damage. There were 3 hull losses and 53 fatalities due to tire• Two
accidents involved fires, caused by separatio,_ of an engine, that
resulted in a catastrophic explosion of the wing tanks. In both
Insta_ices fatalities occ_rred when tanks exploded while the _ircraft
were being evacuated. Another accident involved a fire due to
penetration of the wing tank by debris thrown up from landing gear. In
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this instance the aircraft was successfully evacuated but was destroyed
by fire.
Category 2 accidents involved o_i;, 1 fatality. In this case the
trauma fatality occurred as the aircraft penetrated the airport terminal
(the purser was killed when the hull was ruptured by a building column).
Tbls accident is an anomaly. There were 12 hull losses, 2 of which were
. due to slowly spreading fire. Two accidents involved engine separation
_ and fuel llne fires while another accident was a friction fire due to
nose gear collapse.
Category 3 involves 225 fetallties of which 55 are due to non-tank
rupture fires, 165 to d_ownlng, and 5 to trauma.
! Category 4 accidents involve at least 722 fire related fatallties
./ and 5 trauma fatalities. There are 3 accldents involving 179 occupants
and 130 fatalities that are undefined. The specal case DC-8 accident
was placed in this category because of the major fuel spill resulting
: from tank rupture following engine/pylon separation. Drownings account
for 18 fatalities, at least 15 of which occurred after evacuatlon_ in
most accidents involving drowning, few details are available. In one
: well-documented case the drownings are thought to have occurred after
evacuation and trauma fatal ties were due to seat separation, floor
distortion, and to occupants who did not use their seat belts.
Category 5 involves 934 fatalities of which 45% are cf undetermined
causes. Of the known causes of fatality, 335 are related to fire and
210 are related to trauma.
Category 6 involves 1547 fatalities of which 59% were of
undetermined causes. Of the known causes of fatality 189 are related to
fire and 190 are related to trauma. In 4 accidents only the fate of the
flight deck crew is defined although there are indications of cause with
terms as "many" or "most". The enormity of many accidents and shortage
of pathological skills pzeclude accurate postmortem determination of
cause.
DEFINITION OF ACCIDEN_ SCENARIOS
Recognizing that each crash sequence is unique, the definitions of
the crash scenarios are broad in nature, rather than specific, and are
intended to cover a range of accident occurrences including rather
severe conditions that are marginally survivable. The purpose of
defining such scenarios are for accident c±assiflcation to assisL in the
identification of crash technology phenomena and to allow for the study
of structural failure mechanisms under specified impact conditions.
After an analysis of the structural damage and injury causing mechanisms
three basic crash scenarios evolved: "Air-to-Surface, Hard Landing";
"Air-to-Surface, flight into obstruction"; and "Surface-to-Surface,
overrun".
Air-To-Surface, Hard Landing
This scenario considers those types of accidents in which the
aircraft impacts a level surface from the air, and is characterized by a
high sink rate with wheels up or down, with the airplane in a symmetric
1983019709-014
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nose-up or nose-down attitude typical of a hard landing or approach
accident.
Crashes on final approach usually occur because thc aircraft is not
where the pilot thicks it is. The forward speed of the aircraft is
between the speed for flap deployment (160-175 kts) and stall (120-126
kts). The rate of descent is between 10 and 40 ft/sec. The angle of
the aircraft relative to the ground (pitch) is dependent on the slope of
the ground and the attitude of the aircraft. The airplane attitude is
assumed symmetrical with +15 ° pitch, with impact on the runway or within
60Oft of the runway. The aircraft gross weight is weight at takeoff
less weight of fuel burned.
For landing accidents, forward speed _my be between the prescribed
landing speed and stall speed. Some instances of higher speeds were
noted, but these cases resulted in overruns. The pitch of the aircraft
varies between 3-4 degrees nose down/up to the nose-up stall angle.
Rate of descent is between I0 and 40 ft/sec.
To further explore the effect of rate of descent on fatalities a
graph of fatalities as a percentage of total onboard for air-to-surface
approach accidents, as a function of sink rate, is plotted in figure II.
In figure ll(a) the data from ref. 19 is presented, in ll(b) the data
from ref. 20. and in figure ll(c) the data from ref. 21. Recognizing
the fact chat following initlal impact, subsequent hazards may be
encountered such as impact into columns, ditches or other obstructions
the data plotted in figure II should only be viewed as indicating a
trend. Furthermore, the accidents in which a large percentage of the
fatalities are fire related are shown as solid symbols. Reviewing the
solid and open symbol data for all three data bases indicates a general
increase in trauma-related fatalities occurring at aircraft sink speeds
of approximately 25 fps and above. This trend shows an inherent
structural capability of the airframe to provide a good measure of load
attenuation in the vertical direction, in figure 12(a), (b), (c) the
percent injury to total onboard is plotted as a function of sink rate
for the same air-to-surface approach accidents as in figure II. Again,
the accidents involving a high percentage of flre-related fatalities are
shown as solid symbols. The data exhibit no apparent trend indicating
that injury-causlng mechanisms may be more local in nature than global.
Th_ accident data does show injuries occurring at a sink speed of I0 fps
and above which coincidentally is approximately the landing gear design
sink speed.
Air-To-Surface, Flight Into Obstruction
This scenario considers those accidents in which an airplane
encounters a hostile environment at impact such as during an undershoot.
In this scenario the hazard and terrain _onditions have a significant
influence on the severity of damage the airplane sustains. The hazards
include ravines_ embankments, lights, poles, trees, dikes, buildings and
vehicles. These accidents can be generally des=ribed as controlled or
ucontrolled collisions with an obstacle or hostile terrain (_ndershoot)
occurring near the airport (from 400 to 400Oft off the runway) oc in'
some cases several miles from an airport. If the accident occurs during -
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the landing or approach phase the airplane is in a level attitude_ with
0 ° - +15 ° pitch, and approximately zero roll and yaw. If the accident
occurs during takeoff the pitch can range from 0 ° - +45°j roll from
+5 ° - +45 ° , and the yaw from 0° - +10 °. The ranges of forward speed and
sink speed are from 120 - 200 kts and from 10 to 40 ft/sec.,
respectively. The hazards and terrain conditions have a significant
• affect on the structural damage and alrplan_ post-impact behavior.
Surface-To-Surface
This scenar£o coasiders those accidents in which the aircraft is on
the ground and encounters obstructions. The accident is characterized
by horizontal motion of the airplane into a hazard such as during
take-off abort or landing overrun. The sink speeds, including ground
: slope effects, range from zero to design sink speed. The forward
velocity ranges from 70 kts to rotation speed with the airplane In a
level attitude with some swerve. The damage sustained by the airplane
is a function of the hazard encountered and ranges from paved surfaces,
and hard ground (sliding contact)j to ditches, humps, vehlcles_ light
, poles, buildings, and soft earth.
Finally, classiflcatlons of scenarios are not static but are
influenced by airplane and airport design changes. New accident types
coming into the data base should have a significantly different
: distribution from those of the first 20 years. This distribution might
be expected to be strongly affected by Improvements in accident
avoidance techniques and by reduction of hazards on and around airports.
Development of fire-suppresslng fuel additives could no_ only alter the
_ distribution of accident statistics in the scenarios, but could change
the significance of structural component participatlo_L. Consequently,
the scenarios should be reviewed at intervals to ensure their continuing
applicability. Further, the scenarios should reflect current aircraft
behavior as well as data drawn from historical accident reports.
STRUCTURAL FEATURES AND SUBSYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO OCCUPANT
INJURIES AND FATALITIES
The structural behavior of transport aircraft In accidents
involving substantial hull damage, that are impact surviv-hle, will
contain the loss, destruction, or _amage of one or more structural
components or subsystems. During the sequence of events _s the
destruction occurs and the aircraft comes to a stop, the lives of
persons onboard are being jeopardized. In the 176 accidents reviewed in
the combined data base (fig. 6) it was determined that the most
critical event in the crash sequence that caused most f_talltles was the
release and ignition of fuel creating a fire hazard. For those persons
not injured by impact, the probabillty of survival was determined by
time (measured in minutes and seconds) and by obstructions in the escape
route. In order to define approaches to improve the crashworthiness of
_ransport aircraft it is necessary that the Involvement of the
structural components, systems, and subsystems be determined and the
sequence of events and interaction of their involvement in a variety of
accidents be well understood. (ref. 19).
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Discussion of Lhe ma3or hazards, the dominant structural
> components, aLld the interaction as relating to survivability is
discussed in the following sections.
FaJlure Hechanisms and _;jury Types
In the review and study of historical accident data various
structural failure mechanisms (an be identified and are listed in Table
13. In the sequence of events occurring in an accident several of these
failure mechanisms may be involved and may interact with one another.
The types of injuries that occur are identified in Table 14 (ref. 19).
, The structural components are the landing gear, pylon/engine, wing
box structure, fuselage, fuel distribution system, floor structure,
seats/restraint systems, cabin interior, and entry and escape doors.
: The landing gear includes nose gear, wing mounted main landing gear, and
wide-body fuselage mounted gear. Pylon/engine include wing pod mounted
engines and aft body engines. Wing box structure is concerned basically
with fuel tankage and primary load carrying members. Fuselage includes
lower fuselage, (bottom of fuselage to the cabin floor structure) and
upper fuselage (floor structure to crown). Cabin interiors include
seats, overhead storage, galleys, closets, dividers, lavatories, ceiling
panels, sidewalls, etc.
Subsystem Participation
"the crash dynamic response of these various components, their
interaction with other components, and the direct result of this action,
are given in Table 15 (ref. 19). The frequency of occurrence or
participation of each of these structural system failures in the data
base of accidents considered in ref. 19 is given in Table 16. The
diagonal shows the total participation of any one component while the
off-diagonal values show co-participation of other components. The data
presented on cabin tnterior, seats, doors, floors, and body fuel lines
are cited in the accident data reports. However, in field
investigations of accidents interior structural component failures are
not consistently documented and omission of a particular component does
not necessarily indicate that no f_ilure has occurred.
Subsystem Participation and Accident Severity
In Table 17, the participation of each structural component and
damage category (as defined in Table 11) is presented as a function of
accident scenarios (ref. 19) and subsets within these scenarios. On
the basis of fatalities in percent of occupants, flight into
oSstructions is the most lethal accident followed by air to surface,
unclassified, and then surface to surface. This order tends to agree
with the total energy to be dissipated in the crash. The frequency of
fire, while not independent of the total energy, further increases the
lethality of the accident. Considering total fatalities, the ranking of
the accident scenarios are air-to-surface, flight lntd obstructions,
surface-to-surface and unclassified. No single scenario appears to be
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"the major type for lethality"; rather each must be studied to fully
understand the crash response of aircraft. Likely candidate _cenarlos
would be alr-to-surface impact on gear, surface-to-surface - low
obstructlon and flight into obstruction - impact column.
Structural Factors in Fatalities
_he partlclpa_lon of structural factors In fatalities Is shown in
figure 13 (the number of fatalities coming from Table 12. The major
factor in fatalities is flre/smoke, the unknowns re-resentlng a
combination of trauma and fire. The role of trauma inJuzles in fire
fatalities is undefined. An assessment of the interaction and role of
these structural components in a crash environment is presented In
Appendix A. A more thorough assessment is presented in references (19),
(20), and (21).
POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVING CRASH PERFORMACE
In this section, potentlal research areas In aircraft structural
subsystems are identified. Structural factors in fatalities are
reviewed from Appendix A to indicate those systems for which the
greatest gain In crashworthiness might be achieved. Research areas are
discussed and some approaches are presented. Finally an assessment of
the potential for improvement of structural systems is given.
The accident performance of current aircraft is the result of
continuing engineering effort, based on accident experience, to improve
occupant protection. Certification requires protection of the occupant
in minor accidents. Depending on the details of a very severe accident,
there appear to be zones of survivable environment within the aircraft
even under severe crash conditions.
From the review of accident data tot structural system
participation, total fatalities have been divided into three groups;
trauma, fire smoke, and drowning. In some cases (Table II- category 6)
trauma injuries have resulted in flre/smoke fatalities through
incapacitation of the occupant both inside and outside of the aircraft.
As regards fire/smoke and drowning categories, aircraft evacuation
problems have also resulted in fatalities.
Fire Hazard
Fire/smoke caused the most known fatalltles, followed by trauma,
and then drowning, Table 12. The greatest galn in crashworthlness might
result from containment of fuel, which would eliminate or reduce the
flre hazard. Factors that affect the integrity of the fuel tanks need
to be understood. Severe fuel fires have accounted for, directly or
indirectly, approximately 36% of the fatalities Ill the study of 153
impact survivable accidents (table 12). Hazards consist of burns from
flame and hot gases, inhalation of smoke/fumes from fuel fire,
inhalation of smoke fumes from burning airplane/ baggage/passenger
materials (ignited by fuel fire), and panlc/stampede of passengers due
tc flre/smoke effect.
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To prevent or reduce the numbers of these types of fatalities,
: research areas are identified (listed in order of possiL_e
• effectiveness):
: (1) Fuel Containment
(a) Develop tank vessel/structure to be more resistant to tears, I
rupture, puncture, etc.
(b) Develop wing box structure (assuming integral tank design) that
will fall at predetermined locations when overload forces occur and
include double fuel tank ends at these locations. Thus, wing
f _aration/failure at these "fuse" points between the double tank ends
,y avert massive fuel spills.
: (c) Fuel tank explosions cause massive rupture of the vessel and
instantaneous enlargement of the severe burn area. To eliminate or
reduce the probability of a tank explosion, it is necessary to provide a
flame arrestor media that will act as a deterrent to propagation of an
explosive flame front. This media could be a metallic resistant
material such as aluminum foil or an open-cell plastic foam that has a
high melting temperature and is compatible with hydrocarbon fuel.
(d) Develop fuel transfer/feed lines that are more resistant to
rupture and, In event of rupture, provide automatic shut off of fuel
flow.
(2) Tank Rupture
(a) Main landing gear collapse or separation allows the wing box to
scrub on the runway or terrain and to impact low objects or allow engine
pods to scrub and separate. Main landing gear design that is more
resistant to collapse or separation due to hard landings or travel over
rough/soft terrain would be effective in reducing the number of fire
related accidents (table 16) in which tear or rupture of the wing lower
surface has occurred.
(b) Engine separation and tumbling under the wing has caused
rupture or puncture in the wing box. Engine to strut or strut to wing
design should be developed to reduce probability of separation.
(c) Fuel spill ignition has resulted from engine separation.
During this occurrence the separation and arcing of electrical power
leads can ignite fuel from broken feed lines. Designs to minimize
arcing should be developed.
(3) Fuel Characteristics
(a) Anti-misting fuel reselrch and development should continue.
This technique has the potential to reduce fatalities by reducing the
probability of fuel vapor explosions and by delaying the spread and
intensity of fire in massive fuel spills.
(b) Jelled or emulsified fuel research should also be considered.
From a safety standpoint their viscous nature and low rate of vapor
release are desirable cfsracteristics. However, compatibility of
emulsified fuels and turbine engine performance must be considered.
Evacuatiou from the Aircraft
In most accidents, particularly those involving severe fuel fires,
the speed with which crew and passengers are evacuated has a major
effect on the number of survivors. Experience indicates those occupants
i
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that require more than one minute to evacuate may not survive. This is
due to fuel smoke and flame burning through the fuselage or entering via
a rupture in the fuselage skin. Anything that hinders or delays
passenger/crew movement within the passenger compartment must be
considered a hazard that requires research and study.
(a) Entry, galley, emergency exJt_ and cockpit door design should
be evaluated for both jamming and blockage, This includes door frame
warpage, cabin floor uplift in the vicinity of the door area, door
opening mechanism, sliding door tracks, and adequacy of door viewing
windows. Passenger panic blockage of door opening areas should be
considered duriDg door design.
(b) Overhead passenger storage compartments often open on impact
and spill coutents or collapse/separate from the fuselage structure so
as to inJur,_ passenger heads and block/trap passengers in their seats.
Contents and debris block aisles and hinder passenger movement to exits.
Overwing exits have been blocked by collapsed overhead compartments.
: (c) Passenger and crew seat separations or collapse can trap
passengers in the seat area and, in some ceses, block aisles needed for
evacuation. In some cases seat separations have resulted in passenger
injury which delayed or prevented evacuation and resulted in death due
to fire or smoke.
(d) Partial blockage of aisles and exit areas by galley contents
and interior and miscellaneous debri_ has occurred in about 15% of the
accidents studied. However, in only a few of these was the debris more
than just a slight hinderance in the evacuation. In general the galley
debris concentrates in the area of galley service doors. Since galley
displacement is an infrequent occurrence, research should concentrate on
containing galley contents.
Structural Break-Up
Structural break-up and excessive impact loads have resulted in
trauma fatalities and injuries. These represent approximately 12.5% of
all fatalities in the 153 potentially impact survivable accidents (Table
12). Most of the trauma fatalities occur within the fuselage area but a
few are a result of passengers being thrown out when fuselage break-up
occurs. In many cases trauma injuries are not identifiable because they
result in unconsciousness or inability to evacuate the aircraft or the
fire area outside the aircraft and therefore death occurs due to fire.
Consequently, both the percentage of fire fatalities and trauma
tatalities are conservative since 45% of the fatalities occurring are
classified as "unknown" simply because it can not be determined if they
were solely due to fire or trauma but are a combination of both (see
Table 12, figure I0). To prevent or reduce the number of trauma
fatalities, detailed studies should consider the following research
i areas:
I (a) Fuselage Breaks - Of the 64 accidents involving breaks in the .
fuselage, 23 reported that one or more persons were ejected or fell out
of fracture holes in the fuselage resulting in death or injury,
Similarly, in 13 accidents it was also reported that one or more persons
!
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_ stepped or crawled out of the break (most of these could probably also
have evacuated through available doors and hatches). Study and research
" aimed at improving fuselage structural integrity, particularly breaks
_ and separation, would provide a substantial reduction in trauma
: fatalities.
(b) Fuselage Floor - Elevation or displacement upwards of the
fuselage floor was reported in 36 accidents. Passenger seat elevatlon,
which caused or contributed to serious injuries to passengers sitting in
the seats, was reported in 9 accidents. Localized floor dlsplacement
has also contributed to passenger and crew injuries during evacuation.
Inmost cases floor beams were displaced upwards in addition to the
floor panels. Development of a floor beam and floor panel assembly that
is more resistant to both uplift and separation would reduce trauma
injuries to seated passengers and probably reduce fatalities by not
blocking or restricting evacuation rontes.
(c) Seat Load Limiting and Occupant Retention - While it is
difficult to establish a numerical measure of seat and occupant
retention performance in accidents, research on methods of liultlng
crash loads on occupants through seat design should be continued.
Occupant restraint systems require further study. The floor
track/seat/occupant/restraint system response to the various crash
Ioadlngs should be understood. Effort should be made to establish the
injury toleraace limits of the commercial aircraft occupant.
Effects of Water Entry
Accidents in which aircraft impact water or come to rest in deep
water involve special hazards. Drownings occurred in tl of the 16 water
related accident cases in the data base. Over two thirds of the
drowning fatalities occurred in six of the accidents (air to suzface)
which involved breaking of the fuselage at impact. The other five
accidents involved rupture or tearing of the lower fuselage surface
which allowed rapid entry of water.
(a) To reduce or possibly eliminate fatalities due to drowning,
study and research should center on improving the fuselage pressure
vessel structural integrity, primarily to eliminate fuselage breaks and
lower surface tears. Alrcrafd floatation should be assured if water
touchdown occurs at final approach speed and at a touchdown attitude.
(b) In 3 of the 11 water entry accidents the onboard llfe rafts and
vests were used effectively. In the other 8 accidents, onboard rafts
were not used, were inflated inside the alrcraft, or there were no rafts
onboard. Research of this emergency equipment should include
consideration of external stowage and deployment of rafts.
Aasessment
The potential for improved _ash performance for structural
subsystems has been assessed to provide some guidance for the planning
of research programs. Current structural systems are being designed
with currenL crashworthiness and methods technology. The potential for
improved performance is assessed relative to the crash function.
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Research into the crash behavior of structural subsystems couslsts of
both analysis and test. Emphasis is placed on treatment of subsystems
i because the subsystems must perform their crash function in order to
achieve crashworthlness for the complete aircraft. Further, it is in
detailed mechanisms of failure that engineering changes may be effected.
4
In additlon, detailed crash response of an isolated subsystem may be
i better measured than from complete aircraft testing. On this basis the
assessment in Table 18 is presented.
The rating potential for improved performance is given in relative
terms; C having good potential, B, being better, and A, being highest.
These ratings are subjective and do not reflect the difficulty in
advancing the technology. It is expected that some ratings will change
as future research and development programs progress.
Analytical research treats the methods of modeling the subsystem to
: depict detailed crash response. Subsystems of imediate interest are
wing tankage, seat/occupant, floor/seat/occupant, and fuselage sections.
In this endeavor, the full power of analytical programs may be used to
represent the structure in detail. Results of these analyses should be
: validated with subsystems tests.
Testing of structural subsystems will permit identification of
detailed failure mechanisms and sequences of events in simulated crash
conditions. In addition, these results may serve as a basis for
comparison for the evaluation of advanced material concepts. Advanced
material applications for subsystems should also be tested and
evaluated. As the applications advance, new subsystem specimens may
have to be fabricated, tested, and evaluated.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Current jet transport design methods are continually updated or
modified based on knowledge gained from transport accident data. A
study of transport accident data was undertaken in a Joint research
program sponsored by the FAA and NASA and reported in contract reports
(refs. 19, 20, 21)o Some of the results of these studies have been
highlighted in the present report. There is a point reached in the
study of accident data, however, particularly on the condition and
details of the airplane cabin interior, in which the omission of data
becomes evident and it cannot be assumed that it did not occur, but
rather that it did not get reported. Thus, the ca Jsatlve factors
related to transport fatalities may not be well defined when many
factors interact in the cabin area or when the accident scenario is
complex. However, much can still be learned from the historical study
of accident data.
It became evident from the accident data study tPat the greatest
potential for improved transport crashworthiness is in the reduction of
fire related fatalities. Quoting from refo 19, research relating to
suppression of fire merits the highest priority. Time is a critical
element associated with escape when a severe fuel fire exists outside
the aircraft or when the aircraft is sinking in deep water. If flame
and smoke enter the fuselage passenger area immediately after the
aircraft comes to rest, the probability of escape iS reduced
!
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• substantially. Retaining fuselage integrity and delaying entrance of
smoke and flame is essentia) if survivability is to be enhanced. Debris
and obstructions that hinder movement of persons on the escape route
cause delays that reduce the probability of survlva_. Consequently,
factors that would increase the available time for egress is essential.
Fuel additives as in the anti-mlstlng kerosene research program, ruptu_a
rosistan_ fuel tanks or fuel cells, and structural improvements to
protect fuel tanks _nd occupants should be subjects of research.
Second, structural integrity of fuel systems, fuselage, and landing
i gear are le_dlng candidates for improved crashworthlness. Structural ;
_; integrity of fuel systems is a key factor in suppression of post crash
\' fire. Integrity of the fuselage contributes to the reduction of fire
related fatalities by preventing or delaying the entry of fuel, fire,
and smoke and by maintaining egress routes. Main landing gear that are
:_ more tolerant to off-runway conditions would continue to provide ground
clearance for the wing and engine pods thereby reducing the hazard of
wing breaks, tearing of tank lower surfaces, and engine pod scrubbing or
" separation.
Trauma fatalities have predominated generally, when the energy
absorbing protective capability of the aircraft structure has been
expended and the aircraft has experienced major structural damage.
Trauma fatalities might be reduced, however, by improving the airframe
• energy absorption capability and structural integrity. The dynamic
performance of current occupant seat restraint 3ystems are not well
understood avd the accident data does not define adequately the
relationship between occupant response and structural dynamic
characteristics of the seat, floor, and fuselage. Only recently has
mathematical modeling of the seat and occupant progressed to where some
of this behavior can be more thoroughly explored. Of particular concern
is the dynamic response of the occupants in new seats compared to
conventional seats as both seat and occupant interact with floor
acceleratlcn pulses. This becomes particularly important for
applications of advanced materials. The crash performance of structural
components made from advanced materials must be compared to that of
current structural components. Differences in performance must be
assessed for their effect ov accident performance of the complete
aircraft. Impact response mechanisms of advanced components must be
understood in order that accident structural performance might be
optimized.
New occupant protection concepts for advanced materials may be
required. Current metal aircraft have inherent properties contributing
to crashworthlness protection in addition to other design conditions
that may not be present in aircraft designed with advanced materials.
Of particular concern are wing tanks, fuselage integrity including
energy absorption, and the floor/seat/occupant/restraint system
interaction. Consequently, it may be necessary to introduce new
approaches to occupant protection.
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APPENDIX A - INTERACTION OF STRUCTURAL COMPONENTSAND SUBSYSTEMS
. The details of the assessment of the interaction of str: :rural
components and subsystems are repeated in this appendix as given in ref.
19. Additiocml information on structural component behavior can be
found in refs. 20 and 21. The participation of the components and
their contribution to major injury producing hazards, have been
categorized in this appendix into the following sections: fire hazard,
engine/pylon separation, fuselage break/rupture, blocked egress, landing
gear collapse, water entzy, and seat collapse.
Fire Hazard and Tank Rupture
Severe fuel fires are the primary cause of most fatalities and
result from unwsnted release or spillage of tank fuel. In ref. 19 it
• was reported that 107 accidents involved tank fuel spl]lage, and 85 of
these had fires of varying severity. Spillage directly from the
integral tank usually occurs from six types of events: wing box fracture
or break, lower wing skin tear or rupture, penetration of the tank by an
object, tearing open the wing box durit=g separation of main landing gear
or engine pylon, fuel tank ul±age explosion, and flow from wlng tip
vents, in a given accident two or more of these types of spillage
sometimes occur. These types and the number of occurrences arc shown in
figure AI, and discussed below.
(a) Wing box fracture or break - Most fractures occur due to high
vertical loads or due to impact with large objects such as trees or
buildings. Some wing fractures occur early in the accident se£uence and
the fuselage continues to slide or move, possibly away from = e initial
large fuel spill location. Fuel is usually scattered over a large area.
In other cases the wing fracture occurs at about the time and point
where the aircraft comes to rest and the fuel spill is adjacent, under,
or around the fuselage. If fuel ignition occurs, an almost
instantaneous severe fuel fire develops; this constitutes the "most
hazardous scenario". Damage to other structural components can
influence passenger/crew survivability in this sit,,ation. Fuselage
breaks and fuselage lower surface ruptures can provide immediate access
for flame and smoke to the passenger compartment. Damage to the cabin
interior such as collapsed overhead storage, galley debrio, ruptured
floor, and jammed/blocked exits can impede evacuation. The effect of
englne/pylon separation (in wlng/pylon mounted engines) and gear
separation In malntalning ground clearance of the wing does appear to be
a significant factor.
(b) Ix)we: wing surface tear - Tear or rupture of the wing lower
surface is knowa to have occurred in eight accidents and probably
oc_ured in ]_ others. Those generally occur when the wing is subjected
to scrubbing/sliding on the runway, on rough terrain, or over various
objects. _:cident records indicate that 13 involw_d contact with rough
terrain, 7 involved sliding over fences and wall_ 4 involved sliding on
level ground, I involved settling on a separated engine, and i involved
impact with another aircraft. In 26 of these accidents the aircraft was
destroyed and 40% had fire-related fatalities.
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The L_zard evolvin S £rom Lhese wing ,.ank Lear/ruptures is related _
to the size of the tank opening, the rate at which fuel is released, the _ :
temperature_ and _%etner the fuel was ignited. Many of these
occurrences ]n,,olve _evere fire8, but they tend to be localized In tbe i
_rlng area a_i thereby make it pc sslble for pe_s_n_ onboard to evacuate
from both ends of the fuselage away Crom the fire. The interact .._ and
impact that other structural components have on these _ing lower surface
• tears Is the same as wi_h wing break occurrences. An increase in the •
hazard occurs with time (possibly 30 seconds to 5 mlnutes_; fuel
• ignition ou the wing often causee, tank explosions that spread the fuel _"
furt_"r t ,d intensify the fire, ResearcP should be directed to
containing the fuel within the ta_ or at least restricting the flow of
fue: through the rupture or hole in the wing skin.
Landing gear collapse or separation has been a major factor in 50%
of ;he -_,1.
s_.... and had a lesser effect in about 30% of tLe spi!]So Wln_
mounted englue/pylon separation or collapse during lower surZace tear
failed to maintain _round clearance in 95% of the case-
(c) Gear/pylon tear - Tearing awa) sections or parts of the wlng
box fuel tank and subsequently releasing large quantities of fue_ dutlu 8
separations of main landing gear or of engine pylon is an infrequent
occurrence, be_.ngreported in seven accidents. However, when it does
happen, a severe fuel fire gener..lly occurs. Design philosophy for maln
landing gear and engine pylon _ttac_nt to the wing box should be
revle_ed to ensure these units are fueed for a clean overload separation
that _oes not fracture the integral fuel tank.
(d) Tank explosion - Wing box fuel tank ullage explosions have
been reported in 17 accidents and probably occurred in 6 others° In
most of these, a sevsre fire already existed and generally the size or
: intensity of the fire increased. In most cases it is not known how
many, if any, additional fatalities resulted from the tank explosions
_ but it appears from available data that evacuation was usually affected.
The initial fire in three accidents occurred at the engine pylon wing
Interfcce after engine separation, two of these explosions occurring in
i flight.
- (e) T_n_ puncture - There are three accidents in which tanks have '
been punctured by foreign objects. Two of these accidents occurred
during aircraft operation and resulted in fires that destroyed the
aircraft but for whicL there were no fatalitles. O_e of the_e involved
puncture by debris from a disintegrating engine and _he other involved
parts from a disintegrating wheel. The third incident occurred after
I the accident when the tank was punctured during rescue operations but
! there was no fire.
-_
i (f) Leakage - There are four accidents in which fuel spillage
resulted from leaking tanks. Only one accident experienced fire which
destroyed the aircraft, but there were no fatalities. _lle fire hazard .
is present, these accidents have not been lethal.
Rupture of body fuel lines is a hazard associated with aircraft
s cunflgurations having aft mounted engines or auxiliary power unit. If
fuel tank shut-off valves are activated immediately after a crash, the
amount of fuel spilled due "_ body llne rupture Is only a minor
contributor to the accident seve£ity. However, when the lines are not t
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i shut off, the resulting fire has been catastrophic. For example, in the
727 Salt Lake City accident on November II, 1965, a separated landing
gear penetrated the lower fuselage and ruptured a body fuel line.
•' Forty-three occupants died from fire-related causes. As a result of
i this accident, body lines were strengthened and rerouted to avoid this
type of rupture. The only other instance in which body fuel lines are
thought to be a major contributor to the severity of an accident is the
DC-9 accident at O'_re on December 20, 1972, where the aft fuselage of
:! a DC-9 struck the vertical tail of an 880 during take-off and probably
i ruptured a body fuel line. Ten persons perished from fire-related
causes in this accident.
The wing tank vent system has been involved in one severe fire
I accident, in this case, an engine fire spread to fuel dripping from the
'i adjacent wing tank vent at the wing tip, progressed through the vent
system and caused a tank ullage explosion. Any studies involving fuel
i tank design should include the tank vent system and flame suppression.
J
I
I Engine/Pylon Separation
Separation of an engine fcom the pylon or separation of the pylon
from the wing or body often occurs in accidents involving hard
touchdown, undershoot, overrun, or veering off the runway. When one or
both mala landing gear collapse during these types of occurrences, the
probability of engine pod damage or separation is increased. Generally,
loss of the engine (forward or reverse thrust) is of minor significance
but r_,pturing of the engine _uel feed line (releasing fuel) and tearing
of electrical leads (causing arcing) can be a hazard because of the
potential for a fire occurring at the fuel feed llne break point. The
significance of this pylon-break fire hazard zncreases if the wing fuel
tanks are ruptured and large quantites of fuel are released on the
Bround. It is beli-',ed that the engine and the pylon break fires have
been the ignition source for many of the fuel tank fires. Accident
reports seldom confirm or deny this, since it is not generally possible
to establish from evidence at the accident site what actually provided
the ignition source. In some occurrences, friction sparks from wing or
fuselage sliding on terrain may have caused ignition of released tank
fuel only seconds or microseconds before an engine pylon fire occurred.
It is difficult to establish the actual sequence of events. However,
from a revle_ of accident data, there appears to be a relationship
between wing tank ruptures, severe fuel fires, and pylon break fires
that indicates pylon break fires probably provided the source of
ignition for released fuel in many accidents.
Of the !53 accidents studied in ref. 19, 94 involved aircraft with
engines on wing pods and 59 involved aircraft with engine pods on the
aft fuselage. These two grouDs of air craft were reviewed separately.
(a) Wing pod engine - Of the 94 accidents (including know_ and
probable occurrences) involving wing pod engined alrcraft, 67 (71%)
involved rupturing of the wing box fuel tank and 68 (72%) involved
collapse or separation of the engine pylon to the extent that _e engine
fuel feed line was torn or ruptured. Fuel fires origlnatlnb at the
fracture of the engine fuel feed line in the pylon are reported to have
1983019709-028
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occurred in 12 accidents and probably occurred in 33 accidents. No
fires were reported at this fracture point in 23 accidents. The
proximity of the wing pod engine to the wing box fuel tanks has resulted
in correlations between engine separation, fuel tank rupture, and a
severe fuel fire. Approximately 71% of the accidents involved rupture
of the fuel tank and releasing fuel on the ground and, of these, 91%
" were considered large fuel spills in that the spill area probably was
_; neac or adjacent to the engine pylon location. The study shows that 82%
of the large fuel spills resulted in severe fires and, in 78% of these,
a ruptured engine pylon fuel llne fire probably also occurred.
In numerous accidents, separated enEine pods have rolled or tumbled
under the wing or fuselage as the aircraft slides to a stop. However,
accident reports seldom indicate that the pod ruptured the wing box fuel
tank. In most cases, investigators are probably unable to determine
what objects actually caused tank rupture.
(o) Aft body engine - Of the 59 accidents involving aft body
? engined aircraft, 38 (64%) involved rupturing of the wing box fuel tanks
and 21 (36%) iE olved collapse or separation of the engine pylon to the
extent that the engine fuel feed line was torn or ruptured. Of the 21
occurrences involving engine/pylon collapse or separation, 7 resulted
from a very hard touchdown, 7 due to impact with ground objects, and 7
due to high vertical loads as the aircraft slld over rough ground or
_ impacted water. No engine pod separations were known to be caused by
pod ground contact during aircraft slide on the lower fuselage.
Fuel fires originating at the fracture of the engine fuel feed llne
in the pylon are reported to have occurred in two accidents and probably
occurred in five accidents. Reports indicate that no fire occurred at
this fracture point in 14 accidents. Severe wing tank fuel fires
occurred in 26 accidents but, of these, englne/strut fuel llne fires
were reported in one and probably occurred in 5. This indicates tha_
wing tank fuel, in 77% of these cases, was ignited by something other
than by an engine fuel feed line fire. In the other 23% (six cases) the
reports do not indicate or show evidence that the engine fuel feed llne
fire provided the ignition source for the wing tank fuel fire. Inmost
accidents, the Investlgators are probably unable to determine the actual
source of the spilled tank fuel ignition.
Fuselage Break/Rupture
(a) Fuselage breuk (excluding Fuselage Lower Surface Rupture) - Of
the 153 impact survivable accidents used in ref. 19, 64 are known to
have experienced one or more breaks in the fuselage and 7 others
probably also had breaks. Forty-six of the 64 were fatal accidents.
Available data indicates that 39.5% of the persons onboard in _he 64
accidents were fatalities. Tile other 82 accidents did not experience
fuselage breaks and 27 of these were fatal accidents of which 20.6% of
the persons onboard were fatalities. Of the 64 accidents experienced
fuselage breaks, 6 involved the aircraft touching down in deep water and
58 involved the aircraft touching down (impacting) on ground or in
swampy areas with shallow water. The six deep water entry accidents in
which the fuselage brok_ i;.to several pieces had a 36.8% fatality rate
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(36.8% of those on board) and are discussed under the headir_ "Water
Entry". The flfty-elght ground or swampy slide accidents experienced
fuselage breaks due to main landing gear separatlon/collapse,
excessively hard touchdown or hard flat/impact after takeoff, touchdown
in areas of trees/buildlngs/objects or o_ rocky/rough terrain, or
combinations of these conditions. Of these flfty-eight accidents, 39
involved fatalities which had a 52% fatality rate. In 5 accidents
(8.6%) landing gear collapse or separation is believed to have
contributed to the fus_lage breaking; that is, if the gear had not
failed the fuselage may not have broken.
The accidents are divided into three groups which are discussed as
follows:
I. Twelve accidents involved a sllght break(s)
or fracture in which fuselage secclons did not
separate far enough for a person to be ejected or for
a person to crawl or step out during evacuation
(class 1 of Table 11). These accidents generally
o_cur on or near the airport and are the result of
landing overruns, takeoff abort, or veering off the
runway. Impact _lich caused the fuselage break
usually occurred after considerable braking
decelerations both off and on the runway. Only two
of the accidents (16.6%) involved a severe fuel fire,
and only 6.3% of the persons onboard in these 12
accidents were fatalities.
2. D#enty accidents involved a clean, wide
break in which the fuselage section remained
basically intact but separated far enough for a
person to be ejected or to crawl/step out (class 2 of
Table II). About 75% of these accidents involved
severe fueJ fires and 29.4% of the persons onboard in
these 20 accidents were fatalities. Approximately
half of these accidents involved aircraft impact
speeds of I00 knots or more.
3. Sixteen accidents involved considerable
destruction of tL,_ fuselage sections and in m_st
cases the sections slld or traveled many feet after
separation (class 3 of Table II). During this
movement persons were often throw_/ejected from the
_ remains of the fuselage section. In some cases
ejected persons were killed from trauma, and in other
cases the ejected persons survived because they were
thrown out of a fire or burn area. About 93.8% of
these accidents involved s_vere fuel fires and 77.8%
of those onboard in these 16 accidents were
fatalities In most cases the aircraft speed at
impact was well over I00 knots--two of these had an
: impact speed of 188 and 271 knots, yet some persons
survived, t_ny accidents in this group can be
considered to be only marginally survivable,
It can be concluded that the probability of fatalities in accidents
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resulting in fuselage breaks during ground slides is closely related to !
aircraft speed at the time of impact. The group of accidents resulting i
in only slight breaks (class I) had an average aircraft impact speed of
57 knots and 6.3% of those on board were fatalities. The group
resulting in a clean (but open) break (class 2) had an average speed of
83 knots and 29.4% were fatalities. The group resulting in a torn
fuselage (class 3) had an average speed of 136 knots and 77.8% were
fatalities. (See figure A2). The greater the speedp the greater the
fuselage damage and the greater probability of fuel tank rupture causing
1 severe fire. However, even in the worst cases, some persons onboard :
survived. Design changes that would result in a stronger fuselage that
is more resistant to fragmentation should provide a substantial increase
in survivability for those onboard.
(b) Fuselage Lower Surface Rupture (excluding fuselage break
accidents) - Of the 153 impact survivable accidents in ref. 19_ 57
aircraft are known to have experienced considerable damage to the lower
fuselage and little or no damage to the upper fuselage (above the floor
line). Seventeen of these 57 were fatal accidents, with 17.5% of the
persons onboard being fatalities. In addltion to the accidents noted
above, there are seven accidents that probably experienced fuselage
lower surface damage; three of these were fatal accident3 with 45.8% of
the persons onboard being fatalities.
Lower fuselage tear or rupture generally occurs when the landing
gear fails to support the aircraft. Thus, scrubbing on rough surfaces
(sometimes even on the runway) rlps open the thin skins and body frames.
At the same time, wing box fuel tanks are also subject to rupture and
fuel spillage. In 37 of 53 ground slide accidents (4 of the 57
accidents were water entry accidents), the wing box was probably
ruptured in 32 of these accidents; 25 severe fires resulted and 12 minor
or moderate fires.
I Lower surface damage accidents are divided into three groups for
I study purposes: extensive rupture, minor or moderate damage, and those
invol_ing water entry (the four accidents involving water entry are
discussed under "Water Entry").
I. Twenty-eight accidents experienced
extensive damage and rupture of the fuselage lower
surface. Eleven of these were fatal accidents with
27.7% of the total onboard being fatalities. A
severe fire occurred in 15 of the accidents and 9 of
these were fatal accidents. Six other accidents
involved a minor or moderate fire with no fatalities.
2. Twenty-five accidents experienced moderate
or minor damage of the fuselage lower surface. Of
these only three were fatal accidents, with 1.5% of
: those onboard being fatalities. Six of these
accidents involved a severe fuel firs, four involved
a moderate or minor fire, and six had no fire
reported. Of the three fatal accidents, two had
severe fires and one a moderate fire. Six accidents
involved the nose gear collapsing aft into the lower
fuselage. One resulted in a severe fire (friction
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ignited) which destroyed the aircraft and one
resulted in a moderate fire (also friction ignited)
which resulted in substantial damage. In another
case of friction fire, the aft fuselage broke and was
dragged on the runwa).
In design, the prevention of friction
fires is treated by separation of flammable materials
from the proximity of friction sparks or heated
structure. In operation, rapid action by the airport
fire fighting team has reduced the effect of the
friction fire.
It can be concluded that the probability of fatalities in accidents
resulting in lower fuselage tear or rupture during ground slide is
closely related to the occurrence of severe fuel fire. Flame and smoke
from fuel burning on the ground below and around the fuselage have, in
many cases, rapidly entered the passenger area via openings in the lower
fuselage. If openings had not been present, the precious minute or two
required for skin burnthrough would probably bL adequate for evacuating
most or all persons via escape routes away from burn areas. Of the 12
fatal accidents during ground slide, 11 had severe fire and one had a
moderate fire.
Blocked Egress
(a) Cabin Door or Exlt Jamming or Blockage - Of the 153 impact-
survivable accidents studied in ref. 19, reports for only 47 accidents
cited occurrences of entry door, galley doorj cockpit doorD or emergency
exits jammlng or being blocked by cabin equipment, debrisD or outside
objects. It is believed that door or exit related evacuation problems
also occurred in many other accidents.
Fuselage breaks often provide a handy and expeditious means for
some of the passengers and crew to evacuate the aircraft. In 10 of the
47 accidents, where door/exlt problems were cited, the reports also
indicated that some passengers and crew departed via breaks and holes in
the fuselage. In most cases these people could have also departed
through available doors or exits, l_wever, in a few cases the fuselage
break was probably the only means of escape. In many accidents which
involved severe fuel fires, some doors or exits could have been readily
opened but were not used because of fire in that particular area outside
the fuselage.
Available factual data relating to the 47 accidents citing
door/exlt problems are tabulated in figure A3. These data indicate that
most occurrences (57%) involve doors at the front of the fuselage and
only 16% at mld-body and 27% at the aft fuselage. This ratio is
expected since in ground slide accidents the forward fuselage is
generally the first to impact objects such as buildings, trees, poles,
etc. These data also indicate that forward fuselage doors involved
: Jamming in 64% of the cases and blockage in 36% of the cases. Doors in
the aft fuselage had approximately the same ratio. Mid-body exits,
however, had this ratio reversed with blockage being 64% of the cases
and jamming only 36Z of the cases. It is probable that the wing box
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structure provides protection from Jamming of the mid-body overwlng
exits.
Considering all doors/exits, jaunntng is reported in 59Z of the
cases and blockage in 41% of the cases. Jamming is generally caused by
door frame distortions; however, accident reports seldom provide much
detail on what caused the problem. Floor-lift due to upward forces from
the cargo area often cause total or partial jamming of doors, The same
upward forces may also cause d_or frame distortion. In a few cases
evacuation slides are involved in d_or jamming. Blockage is generally
caused by collapsing of overhead storage compartments and release of the
contents. This debris usually results in complete inability to open the
door _¢ exit. Spillage of galley contents occurs frequently, which
tends to cause a delay in opening the door. In a few cases displacement
of a galley or coat storage compartment has caused door blockage,
partlcuarly at the forward fuselage locations.
The number of fatalities that were a direct result of door Jamming
or blockage can seldom be determined or even estimated from available
data. Of the 47 accidents in which door/exit problems were cited, only
24 involved fatalities (2187 tot_l onboard of which 755 or 34.4g were
fatalities). Of the 24 accidents with fatalities, 9 had two or more
doors or exits jammed or blocked and 41.9% of those onboard were
fatalities. In the other 15 _:cident_ only one door or exit Jammed or
was blocked and 27.1% of those _.board were fatalities.
From this study of door and exit problems during emergency
evacuations, it can be concluded that survivability might be increased
if floors and structure in thc area o each entry and galley door were
designed to eliminate jamming of doors, and if overhead storage
: compartments were designed to resist collapse and reduce door blockage./
(b) Fuselage floor displacement - Displacement and rupture of the
passenger floor has resulted in passenger and crew injuries, and has
restricted movement of survivors to exits. In some cases the upward
movement of the floor has resulted in the jamming of doors or door
frames and in other cases doors could not be opened due to debris
blocking the door. Generally, floor surface displacement Is a result of
the structural floor beams being torn, ruptured, and displaced upwards
by the impact forces of cargo, cargo containers, separated landing gear
or ground objects. The exception to this is floor displacement by the
hydraulic action of water when the aircraft touches down in .mter or
rol_ into water at high speed--in these cases the floor beam may not be
displacuu u_ward.
Of the 153 accidents studied in ref. 19, 36 are known or reported
to have experienced passenger or crew area floor displacement or
rupture, and this occurred probably in 4 other accidents. Statistical
data on these occurrences are tabulated in figure A4o For study
purposes, these 36 accidents are divided into three groups: 15 that did
not involve a fuselage break, 17 that did involve a fuselage break, and
4 that involved the aircraft touching down or overrunning into water.
These groups are discussed as follows:
I. Of the 15 accidents which did not have
fuselage breaks, 8 involved displacement upwards of
the cabin floor as a result of the nose gear
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_olding/collapsing aft into the lower forward
fuselage cargo compartment or electronic compartment.
Displaced cargo or electronic equipment forced the
floor up and probably tore or bent the floor beams.
In four of these accidents the cockpit door was
jammed, and in two the entrance door was jammed or
blocked. None of these were fatal accidents;
however, one resulted in a friction-ignited fire at
the nose gear tires which spread and destroyed the
aircraft.
! Seven other accidents involved a
* ground slide in which the fuselage lower surface was
torn or crushed upward such that floor a_td floor
beams were displaced upwards in localized areas. In
one of these a main landing gear assembly
rolled/tumbled under the fuselage and caused much of
the damage. In three accidents, an entrance door was
jammed or blocked by the floor.
Passenger seat elevations occurred in
seven accidents which contributed to passenger
injuries. In three accidents passenger seat
separations occurred. Accident reports in these
cases did not site seat separation or floor
displacement as interferring with passenger egress.
2. Seventeen accidents which had fuselage
breaks also had areas where the flc_ was displaced
upwards. These accidents tend to be more severe than
those without fuselage breaks. If fuselage
separation is complete and wide enough for human and
seat ejection, the effects of passenger floor
elevation or rupture on survivability is reduced. In
13 accidents passenger seat separation was reported
and in 9 accidents seat elevation was reported, but
in only 4 accidents was passenger egress reported to
have been impeded. It is not known how much
influence the elevated or broken floor had on
passenger egress. Passenger entry door jam was
reported in five accidents and crew door jam in two
accidents. Cause of these door jams in most cases
could not be established with any certainty but was
probably due to either floor elevation rupture or due
to fuselage break if the break was adjacent to the
door.
3. Crew/passenger floor elevation and rupt_'_
occurred in four accidents which involved th_
_ aircraft touching down in deep water or rolling into !
water at high speed. In these cases the lower
fuselage surface _ s torn open and the lower (cargo) _
area filled with water. Hydraulic action/pressure
forced the floor panel upward, causing seat ,,,
separation in two accidents and seat elevation in _i
l
t ,
I'
1,i
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three accidents. Exit doors were found to be blocked
in two accidents.
In one accident, the forward closet dislodged. It shifted forward
in such a way that the forward entrance door was partially blocked and
delayed opening of the door. Also a section of floor came up and
created an opening through which two of the crew fell into the lower
forward compartment. In another accident, the nose gear separated and
tumbled arc, rupturing the lower fuselage. Floor beams and floor panels i-_
were elevated causing passenger seats to tilt backwards and block
emergency exits on both sides of the fuse lage.
Available accident data provides evidence that displacement,
elevation, or dislodging of the passenger/cockplt floor system in
localized areas has resulted in passenger and crew injuries and has, in
varying degrees, interferred with or delayed the evacuation of pasenger
and crew. However, accident reports generally provide very little
detailed information on this type of damage unless it Is related to the
cause of the accident. It is concluded from reviews of available data
that a floor system more resistant to tear/rupture/separatlon, though
still flexible, may reduce some of the factors which are believed to
impede evacuation of the aircraft.
(c) Cabin interiors - In the accident study, the 45 accidents
where cabin interiors have been cited should serve as an indication of
possible crash behavior of cabin interior equipment. The 23 accidents
where probable participation has been assessed may not include all
incidents. In some accidents where at least one feature of the cabin
interior participated, participation of other features are probable.
Overhead storage compartments have been assessed with regard to
separation, spillage of contents, evacuation blockage, and injury to
occupants. Ceiling panels, sidewall liners, and class partitions have
been assessed for separation. Thls separation usually has some effect
on egress. Galleys have been assessed for spillage of contents as well
as egress blockage. These units are of particular concern since they
affect availability of the service doors as an egress route, These
assessments are shown in figure AS. Cabin interiors have been a major
factor in evacuation in 12 known accidents and a probable factor In 14
accidents. Overhead storage has caused injuries in five knu%_r..accldents
and probably caused injury in three additional accidents.
Figure A6 shows interaction between other structural systems and
the cabin interior system. Crush of the lower fuselage is deemed to
have occurred in 52 of the 68 accidents. Fuselage breaks are deemed to
have occurred in 32 of the 68 accidents, landing gear separation or
collapse occurred in 48 accidents and the gear was retracted In 6 other
cases. Floor distortion is deemed to have occurred in 26 accidents.
All of these interactions participate in _everely loading the structural
supports for the cabin interior equipment. Flre was present in 41 of
the accidents.
landing Gear Separation/Collapse i
There are 96 accidents in which one or more cf the landing gear i
i
I
i
[I
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separated or collapsed. In addition there are 15 accidents in which the
gear was stowed or retractea. The effect of gear separation or collapse
will be considered, followed by the effect of gear in stowed positions.
Some comparison of the two effects will be made.
Referring to table 16, the total occurrences show that for 95 cases
of gear involvement (I accident involves debris from the gear damaging
" the aircraft) there were 80 hull losses, 64 fires, 71 tank ruptures, 46
wing mounted engines/pods separated (II cases of engine separation
involve aft mounted engines), 62 fuselage breaks or crush, 38 door hatch
involvements, 33 floor distortions, 33 cases of debris, and 26 seat
involvements.
Direct effects of gear separation are: separation of wing pod
mounted engines; rupture of fuel tanks by failing to maintain ground
clearance and by the separating gear tearing a wing box; and damage to
the lower fuselage by crushing, friction, and by breaks. Secondary
effects are fire due to fuel spillage from ruptured fuel lines and tanks
and to friction, floor distortions, door/hatch problems, seat
separation, and debris due to the distortion and breaks of the fuselage
as a result of ground contact. In 67% of the accidents all gear
separated or collapsed, while in 22% only the main gear separated or
collapsed, and in 9% only the nose gear separated or collapsed and in 2%
the nose gear and one main gear separated or collapsed.
Gear separation or collapse was involved in tank ruptare in 17
cases of lower surface tear, 12 cases of wing breaks, 14 cases of wing
box tear, and 4 cases of tank leakage. This fuel spillage resulted in
42 fires. Thus gear separation or collapse is a faccvL in 64% of the
fires that occurred when the landing gear participated in the accident.
Using small, medium, and large as the degree of involvement, the gear
was a large factor in 26 of the 42 fires, a medlmum factor in 4 of the
fires, and a small factor in 12. With respect to fatalities, there were
28 accidents with fire related fatalities and 24 accidents wlth trauma
deaths.
Lower fuselage crush occurred in 53 accidents with gear separation
being a large factor in 37 cases. Lower fuselage crush has a secondary
effect on door/hatch jamming, on separation of seats, and on cabin
interior debris. Gear separation was a large factor in 9 cases of
fuselage breaks. For 15 accidents in which the gear was known to be
retracting or in the stowed position, there are ony 5 cases where having
gear extended may have prevented the crash. These cases mostly involve
extensive sllde-out, but occurred during aborted takeoffs or flight
activities for which the gear is normally retracted.
From the above discussion it may be concluded that development of
gear more tolerant to conditions that cause separation would result in
some increase in crashworthiness. Further, when separation does occur,
the wing box should not tear open.
Water Entry
Accidents in which aircraft impact on water involve special
hazards. In air to surface accidents involving impact in water, 46.3%
of the occupants drowned. In II of the 16 water accldents water was an
important factor in survivabiity. These II cases are reviewed.
1983019709-036
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; Water entry accidents of concern appear to have some common
factors. First, they usually occur at night. Second, there is usually
/
a relatively rapid loss of flotation resulting in a portion or all of
the aircraft sinking. Third, while there has been confusion, most
occupants have been able to evacuate the aircraft. Finally, many of the
drowning fatalities occur after the occupants have left the aircraft.
Assessment of the water entry accidents is shown in figure AT. The
accidents are divided into two groups: hlgh-energy impact and slide/roll
into the water. There are eight high-energy accidents, and three cases
where the aircraft rolled or slid into the water. For all of these
: accidents the fuselage experienced either lower surface crush or had one
or more breaks. In all the higher energy impacts there was a loss of
floation attributed primarily to fuselage damage. While tank rupture
resulted in some loss of buoyancy, the major effect of tank rupture was
to expose occupants to fuel (chemical) burns and to make everything
slippery.
Six water entry accidents in which the fuselage broke into several
pieces (fuselage break,A7) had fatalities (36.8% of those persons
onboard). In five of these accidents one section of the fuselage sank
rapidly: some of the passengers and crew probably were ejected or fell
into the sea without benefit of survival gear and others were trapped
i inside. The other fuselage sections floated briefly, allowing
evacuation into rafts or floating slides. In other accidents the
fuselage sections floated briefly, but 84% of those onboard drowned.
Survivor reports indicated that in at least two accidents, interior and
carry-on debris blocked evacuation routes and in two other accidents
some exlt doors were jammed. In another, the passenger compartment
floor was displaced upward restricting evacuation.
Touchdown in deep water or rolling into deep water at high speed
caused the lower surface of the fuselage to be torn or ruptured but the
fuselage did not break (lower fuselage crush,AT). Three of these four
lower fuselage crush accidents resulted in extensive lower surface
damage and the aircraft sank rapidly. All three were fatal accidents
with 18.1% of persons onboard being fatalities. One accident resulted
in moderate damage to the lower surface as the aircraft rolled into
water and came to rest on its gear with the water level at or slightly
above the cabin floor. There were no fatalities. Uowever, in these
accidents the aircraft floated at least 5 minutes and in most cases 10
to 20 minutes, thus allowing adequate time to escape. In three of the
four accidents it was established that the onboard rafts and floating
slides were not used.
The floor system was _lown to be disrupted in six of the eight high
energy water entry accidents. Disruption was due in part to the
hydrodynamic forces of water entetlng the fuselage underside through
breaks in the fuselage. A part of this disruption resulted in
displacement and elevation of floor beams with subsequent separation of
seats, which contributed to problems in the evacuation of the aircraft.
In addition, doors were jammed and d_bris from cabin interior systems
was present.
Accidents where aircraft skidded or rolled into water experienced
similar damage as the high energy impact, but to a lesser degree,
1983019709-037
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However, close proximity of land substantially reduced drowning. The 15
drownings in the DC-8 Rio de Janeiro accident (table 8) were attributed
to disorientation of the occupants after they evacuated the aircraft and
to improper use of flotation devices. After the DC-9 St. Croix
accident (table 8), a special study (ref. 25) was made by the NTSB on
water ditching. Here, even though it was known that ditching was
. inevitable, 23 occupants drowned. There were problems with life rafts,
life vests, and seat belt_. Ocher problems with this equipment were
encountered in the DC-8 h,s Angeles accident (table 8). It is felt that
• the incidence of drowning could be substantially reduced by better
location of life r:f_s. For instance, placement of rafts above the
exits with external access might provide better accessibility.
It can therefore be concluded that in deep water entry accidents in
which the fuselage does not break, the survivor rate should be very high
with proper crew response/actlons using available equipment. Improved
crashworthiness might also be obtained by increasing the resistance of
the fuselage to breaks and by increasing the resistance of the lower
fuselage to water penetration.
Seat Collapse
Seats interface with the occupant and with the structure to which
they are attached. Three basic types of seats are of concern: crew
seats, flight attendant jumpseats, and the aoublc and triple bench
seats, for passengers. Crew seats are single seats that are
mechanically adjustable to conform to pilot preference and are attached
to the cockpit floor structure. A combination shoulder and lap belt
restrain the occupant. Flight attendants" jumpseats may be single or
double units attached to a bulkhead and mechanically folded or retracted
when not in use. These seats support vertical loads, with the restraint
harness transmitting side and longitudinal loads to the structure.
Passenger seats are attached to floor tracks and in some designs to the
fuselage sides. Floor tracks are attached to the floor structure or to
pallets attached to the floor structure. _te passenger is restrained by
means of a lap belt.!
l (a) Seat/Structure Interface - For the interaction of seats withJ
I structure, no distinction is made for typ. of seats, but two
1 interactions are of concern with the structure--the effect of a fuselage
'I break and the distortion of the floor. In a fuselage break, santa may
be ejected through the break, or may simply separate from a broken floor
track. In floor distortion, seats may separate from the track, or may
be elevated.
The potentially most lethal of these interactions is ejection
through the fuselage break. Survlval of the occupant is a matter of
:t chance, depending on m_ny factors such as velocity of ejection, nature
of impact area, and the orientation of the occupant at impact. Further,
' the ejected occupant may be in an area that is exposed to fire or is '
overrun by the advancing aircraft. Seats located in the vicinity of a
i fuselage break may be subject to high acceleration pulses due to the
i redistribution of the stored strain energy as the structure breaks.
This frequently results in the separation of the seats due to rupture of ':
1983019709-038
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may then shift positioR and cause inj,ry or hinder the egress of thc
occupant.
Seat dislocation caused by floor distortion may be due to
separation or to elevation of the seat. Separation may force the
occupant into contact with interior objects and may hinder egress.
Floor elevation may block egres3 routes such as over-wing escape
hatches, may hinder the occupant in exiting from the seat, or may force
contact with the cabin interior. For crashworthiness, it is desirable
to keep seats attached in place, and to maintain a survl_able volume for
the occupant.
,'here are 48 accidents with identified interactions and another 21
accidents to which probable interactions were assigned. Assessment of
these accidents is shown in figure AS. Fuselage break has resulted in
15 certain and two probable accidents where one or more occupant was
ejected through the break. Separation of some seats at the break with
the seats remaining in the aircraft occurred in 30 accidents wit
probable occurrence in at least 13 other cases. Seat separation due to
floor or fuselage side distortion occurred in 19 accidents with probable
occurrence in 5 other caoes. Elevation of the seat without separation
occurred in 14 accidents with 4 other probable occurrences. Seat
detachment (separation) is generally associated with loss of structural
integrity due to destruction of the fuselage shell, fuselage breaks_ and
to extreme distortion of the structure. OetachmeL_t may occur if all the
seat legs or attachment fittings rupture or if the seat tracks rupture.
This indicates that a more compliant _;e_t/floor substructure to
accommodate distortion mlghc be more beneficial than an increase in seat
strength criteria.
(b) Seat/Restraint System - The discussion of seat/restraint system
performance in survivable crashes is presented in two parts. The first
part includes those accidents in which some injuries might be related to
seat strength performance and in which seat/restraint performance were
cited by the accident investigation team. The second part includes
serious accidents in which the seat/restralnt performance was not cited
and in which no injuries that might be related to seat strength
occurred.
Thirty-one accidents were found in which seat performance was
mentioned in NTSB reports. A detailed review of these accidents
indicated that the 5eats provided some protection to the occupant
depending upon the crash loads. The current study drew upon NTSB
accident reports and special studies, NTSB _an Factors Factual
Reports, NTSB Public Hearing Dockets, and the manufacturers accident
files for each accident. A separate FAA study (ref. 26) also treatd
NTSB data, and includes FAA Civil Air Medical Institute (CAMI) data but
does not include the manufacturers files.
For engineering purposes it is necessary to relate seat performance
to injury. To do this it was necessary to review the Human Factors
Factual Reports and, in some instances, survivor testimony. The NTSB
statistical category, "Serious Injury", used in NTSB Accident Reports
does not necessarily ideutify actual physical injury nor relate injury
mechanisms to injury. Accident victims who are hospitalized for 48
1983019709-039
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY .39
hours for medical observation, legal considerations, or other reasons
are listed as serious injuries even if _l,ere iP no treatment. An
immediate improvement in crashworthlne_c stati_tlcs could be obtained
simply by using a more accurate definition of ==r!ous injury.
In the accident review in ref. 26, investigators did not identify
a single trauma fatality caused by lack of seat strength or seat
attachment strurture strength. It is recognized that such
identification is d_fflcult because of incomplete knowledg_ of Local
crash dynamics, fatal injury mechanisms, and survivor testimony. Al'o,
postcrash fire frequently consumes necessary evidence. There are
limited, though subjective, indications where an increase in attachment
strength may have provided some benefit. For instance, one passenger in
the 727 St. Thomas accident (table 8) was ejected in his seat thrcagh a
fuselage break and died of trauma injuries. This seat was located in
the aircraft in the region of fuselage rupture.
It can be observed that injuries are sustained in deforming of
seats. The cases discussed in ref. 19 involved serious injury caused
by seat/restralnt system crash behavior. Of the twenty-nlne accidents
involving seat citations, twenty-slx also involved a hull loss, 19
involved fire, 22 lnvolved at least one fuselage break, 14 involved
severe floor distortion, and 4 involved water impact. Seat-related to
the head, spine, chest, and pelvis are of concern, although injuries of
these types may arise from a variety of other causes. In ref. 19,
these injuries are reported the flight deck crew and passengers, while
spine and pelvis injuries are reported for flight attendants. There are
eight accidents Jn which flight attendants suffered spinal injuries
while seated. In the DC-8 Anchorage accident, one injury occurred when
the seat retracted from under the attendant during upward acceleration
causing the attendant to fall to the floor. The remaining injuries
occurred with the flight attendants in the seat. Two flight attendants
had spinal and pelvic injuries in the high longitudinal deceleration 727
JFK accident on June 24, 1975, even though there'was no damage to the
, seat/restralnt system. D_st of these citations involve instances of
: seat collap_e or partial collapse due to rupture of a binge, seat
I attachment fitting, or of the supporting mechanism. The injuries
sustalned did not cause loss of mobility in most cases.
1 Four accidents are of concern in accident performance _f the flight
I deck seats. In the DC-S Portland accident, the right side of the
i cockpit experienced loss of survivable volume due to impacting a large
! diameter tree (of the cockpit occupants, only the Captain survived).
_ne First and Second Officer'8 seats separated while the Captain's seat
was attached Out was loose and had some seat pan deformation.
For commercial jet transport aircraft_ there is little evidence of
; seat separation with subsequent "stacking" in the forward section uf the
aircraft. Two exceptions to this are the DC-9 St. Crolx accident
(table 8) where three double seats stacked due to the impact of some
passengers who did not use their lap belts; and the 737 Midway accident
(table 8) where two triple seats (rows 14 and 15 A, B, and C) stacked
due to severe structural damage to the fuselage in that area. The _ore
severe injuries occur in the vicinity of fuselage breaks and areas of
1 extreme fuselage distortion. _is might be expected since these are
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locations of very high loadings and areas whe , the airplane structure
has lost its ability to protect the occupants
For a more definitive discussion of individual accident cases
relative to seat/restraint system performance see refs, 19, 20, and 21.
An overall assessment of seat/restralnt system performance, as stated in
ref. 21, is:
"The performarce of seats with regard to protecting
occupants during an accident _s generally good
provided the structural Inte_rlty of the fuselage
shell and supporting floor struct_'re is maintained.
The most vulnerable area for seat failure appears to
be at the attachment to the floor. While seats
exhibit desirable deformation charac_erlstics in the
process of failing there Is little quantitative data
available with regard _o load vs. stroke
characteristics. Fresentiyt static tests are
performed to determine strength. The current static
requirements appear to account for dynamic effects_
possibly because:
I) seat_ may have higher strength than
is required and,
2) metal support structure has
inherent crush capability which provides energy
absoprtion i_tan overload cond_tlon"
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